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1 Introduction
The question of the optimal long run inflation rate has been rejuvenated by the discussion of
the objective function of central banks (Bernanke and al., 1999). This hot debate has of course
produced many empirical and theoretical contributions (e.g., Walsh, 1998 and Lucas 2000).
Many of these outlined the cost of inflation either theoretically (Sargent and Lungqvist, 2000,
chap. 17) or empirically (Fisher, 1993). Most of the theoretical models yield the Friedman Rule
as a long run optimal evolution of inflation (Abel, 1987). This rule stipulates that monetary
authorities must induce a long run deflation such that the nominal interest rate is driven to 0.
This kind of policy recommendation is at odds with the actual practice of central banks, which is
always to target small positive value of long run inflation, usually between 1 and 3 % (Bernanke
and Mishkin, 1997). In the literature, the rationale for a positive value of inflation invokes
many arguments, including among which nominal downward rigidities (Akerlof, Dickens and
Perry, 1996), the zero bound on the nominal interest rate, measurement problems and the fear
of deflation (Delong 1999), which could lead to credit problems. This paper explores precisely
the relationship between credit problems and inflation. The goal is not only to assess whether
credit problems are worsened because of deflation but also, symmetrically, if a small positive
inflation can loosen credit constraints and hence increase welfare in the long run, which could
justify the positive inflation target of the central banks.
The basic intuition can be written simply. First, because of credit constraints the decentral-
ized level of investment can be too low and the long run capital stock may be to small. Second,
inflation decreases the financial return on money and thus induces a shift away from money
toward financial savings. This is the so-called "Tobin eﬀect" (Tobin, 1965). The resources avail-
able to finance investment increase, which can increase the welfare of the economy. As noted
by Walsh (1998), this eﬀect has not been modeled with explicit micro-foundations yet, although
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they are necessary for at least two reasons. First, one must have an explicit social welfare func-
tion to derive the eﬀect of inflation on welfare and not only on real variables. Indeed, inflation
decreases the return on money balances, which reduces the ability of private agents to smooth
their consumption. Second, one has to prove that the eﬀect of inflation on capital accumulation
holds in the long run and not only during the adjustment process.
This paper introduces explicit microfoundations based on rational expectations and on flex-
ible prices and shows that there is a positive long run inflation rate, around 1.5%, which maxi-
mizes the social welfare. This result is the eﬀect of three standard imperfections.
The first one is a standard shopping time constraint used in a growth model. This constraint
yields a money demand, even when money is dominated by other assets. More importantly, the
second imperfection is the introduction of credit constraints in monetary growth models. The
empirical relevance of credit constraints has been highlighted by many papers (see Chirinko and
Schaller, 1995; Hubbard, 1998). The theoretical researches on microfounded credit constraints,
such as Holmstrom and Tirole (1997, 1998a,b) based on moral hazard or Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997) based on lack of commitment, imply that the amount of borrowing available to private
agents is below its optimal value and that it is limited by the amount of pledgeable income which
can be used as collateral.
The third one is a non Ricardian economy based on an overlapping generation structure.
The choice of a non Ricardian structure stems first from empirical studies which reject the
altruistic model of the family (Hurd, 1990; Altonji, et al., 1992, 1997). If the bequest motive
is not crucial to the saving behavior, then the infinitely living representative agent may not
be a satisfactory assumption for studying the long run eﬀect of monetary policy. Indeed, from
the work of Weiss (1980), Abel (1987), Buiter (1988) and Weil (1991), it is known that in
these non Ricardian frameworks money is not super-neutral : changes in the inflation rate have
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long run real eﬀects on capital, even with the assumption of rational expectations and flexible
prices. Indeed, to put it like Weil (1991), inflation is a transfer of resources between generations,
hence it aﬀects long run real allocations. As was shown by Buiter (1988), as soon as living
households expect agents to enter the economy without any bequest, the economy becomes
non Ricardian. Various formalizations of non Ricardian environments such as the two-period
overlapping generations framework (Weiss, 1980), or the overlapping generations structure with
infinitely living agents (Weil, 1991) have been studied in the literature. To allow for a simple
analysis of credit constraints with analytical results, I use the simplest non Ricardian monetary
setting, which is a two-period OLG structure with a shopping time constraint.
It is shown that the standard rules for characterizing economic eﬃciency, such as the Golden
Rule (Abel, 1987), do not apply when credit constraints are binding. It induces under-investment
compared to the optimal level. Because of the non Ricardian structure, a positive inflation
decreases the long run real interest for the new money to be accepted and increases the long
run capital stock. This eﬀect can alleviate the initial negative eﬀect of credit constraints. But,
inflation has also the standard distorting eﬀect on consumption because it prevents households
to smooth optimally their consumption (Abel, 1987; Lucas, 2000). Hence, inflation is related to
a trade-oﬀ between investment and the allocation of consumption.
The model yields two results. First, the optimal inflation rate is determined for the case of an
un-optimized fiscal policy. With realistic parameter values, it is shown that the optimal annual
inflation rate is around 1.5%. Moreover, this value increases as credit constraints become more
severe. Second, I show that the first best can be achieved if both fiscal and monetary policy
are optimally designed. A simple fiscal policy can alleviate the distorting eﬀect of inflation by
introducing a proportional tax on consumption. The value of inflation which allows the first
best to be reached is again positive.
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This paper is related to two strands of literature. The first one concerns the economy of
credit constraints. More precisely this paper is related to the recent models which give explicit
microfoundations based on asymmetries of information to credit constraints and to the role of
collateral, such as Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) or Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). Kiyotaki and
Moore introduce credit constraints to model credit cycles and do not focus on long run inflation.
The question of my model is close to the one addressed by Holmstrom and Tirole (1998a),
which concerns the supply of public liquidity in the economy. Whereas their recommendation is
that the State should provide pledgeable income to private agents to reach the optimal level of
production, I show that monetary policy is a simple tool with which to alleviate the eﬀects of
credit constraints thanks to a decline in the real interest rate.
Second, this paper is related to the literature on optimal monetary policy in non Ricardian
environments (Weiss, 1980; Abel, 1987; Weil, 1995; Benassy, 2003a,b). It builds on Weiss (1980)
and Abel (1987). The basic framework is an OLG model, with a shopping time constraint.
Such a framework yields a cost of inflation and the Golden Rule and the Friedman Rule are
optimal when there are no credit constraints. Credit constraints are introduced as a simple
deviation from this benchmark case. The introduction of a non Ricardian structure with credit
constraints distinguishes this model from other study of optimal monetary policy (Chari et al.,
1996; Sargent and Lunqvist, 2000 among others).
The paper is presented in eight sections. Section 2 introduces the OLG structure. Section 3
presents the production sector and the formalization of credit constraints. Section 4 determines
the first best level of production and exhibits the eﬀects of market imperfections. Section 5
presents market equilibria and determines the link between inflation and the real interest rate.
The eﬀect of inflation on welfare is analyzed in section 6, which yields an optimal inflation rate
when fiscal policy is not optimized. Section 7 exhibits the optimal fiscal and monetary policy
5
and shows that the first best can be achieved. Section 8 is the conclusion.
2 Population
The model has an overlapping generations structure, where each agent lives for two periods.
There are two types of agents at each period, workers and entrepreneurs. To simplify the
algebra, I assume that the populations of entrepreneurs and workers grow at the same rate n,
and that their size is equal to Lt at each period.
Lt = (1 + n)
t (1)
The economic role of entrepreneurs is presented in section 3.2 and concerns the intermediate
good sector.
Each worker can sell inelastically one unit of labor when young and consumes both when
young and old. The net nominal revenue of a young worker is composed of two elements. The
first one is the wage income wt earned in the first period of life. The second element is the
amount of money given by the state, Ptµt, where µt is the quantity of money given in real
terms, and where Pt is the price level of the final good.
The net nominal revenue of old workers is the sum of the gross revenue of savings st held
in financial assets, that is st (1 + rt+1) where rt+1 is the riskless nominal interest rate between
period t and period t + 1, and the amount of money held Mt. Moreover, I assume that the
workers can fully diversify their risks on the financial markets. As there is no aggregate risk, the
revenue from financial savings is thus deterministic. To simplify the algebra, I assume that the
instantaneous utility function is u(.) = ln(.). This specification allows for a simple derivation of
analytical results for all specifications of the model.
The money demand is modeled by a shopping time model1. Each young household spends a
1The same money demand can be obtained with the cash-in-advance constraint introduced by Alvarez et al.
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given amount of time l¯ to acquire consumption good. As is standard in shopping time model,
the time spent is lt negatively related to the level of consumption, and negatively related to the
holdings of real money balances Mt
Pt
. I use the following standard transaction technology
lt =
ct
Mt/Pt
θ˜
where θ˜ is a parameter corresponding to the time cost per trip to the bank as in Baumol (1952).
As a consequence, the demand of real money balances is
Mt/Pt = θct
where θ = θ˜
l¯
< 1 (at least one trip to the bank). The rationale for money demand is crucial in
non Ricardian framework to assess the long run eﬀect of inflation. Hence, this money demand
function is discussed below in relation to basic empirical facts.
A worker born at date t chooses his consumption at date t, t + 1, namely cyt , c
o
t+1 to solve
the standard following program
max
c
y
t ,c
o
t+1,st,Mt
ln (cyt ) + γ ln
¡
cot+1
¢
s.t. Ptc
y
t + st +Mt = wt + Ptµt
Pt+1c
o
t+1 = st (1 + rt+1) +Mt
Mt = θPtc
y
t with θ ≤ 1
The first two constraints are the budget constraints at period t and t + 1, the third constraint
is the money demand for liquidity services. The solution of this program is simply
c
y
t =
1
1 + γ
1 + rt+1
1 + (1 + θ) rt+1
µ
wt
Pt
+ µt
¶
(2)
cot+1 =
γ
1 + γ
Rt+1
µ
wt
Pt
+ µt
¶
(3)
(2001), which is that current consumption is limited by current money holdings. Hence ct ≤ νMt/Pt
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Where, with standard notations, Rt+1 denotes the real gross interest rate between period t and
t+ 1 :
Rt+1 =
(1 + rt+1)Pt
Pt+1
(4)
Consumption of workers satisfy the following relationship
cot+1
c
y
t
= γ
1 + (1 + θ) rt+1
1 + rt+1
Rt+1 (5)
The demand for money is simply given by
Mt
Pt
= θ
1
1 + γ
1 + rt+1
1 + (1 + θ) rt+1
µ
wt
Pt
+ µt
¶
(6)
This relationship proves that the demand for money is a decreasing function of the nominal
interest rate, everything else being equal. Indeed, the nominal interest rate should be seen here
as the diﬀerence between the real return on financial markets, rt+1 − πt+1, if πt+1 is the annual
net inflation rate, minus the real return on money, which is −πt+1. As a consequence, controlling
for the real interest rate, the real money demand is negatively related to the inflation rate.
This relationship is a first justification for the choice of shopping time model. Indeed, the
negative correlation between inflation and real money demand is a well established empirical
fact (Goldfeld and Sichel, 1990; Attanasio et al., 2002). In this framework, the formalization of
money demand by the standard cash-in-advance assumption yields a money demand which is
an increasing function of the nominal interest rate, what is inconsistent2. This relation between
the demand for money and the nominal interest rate can also be obtained in models where
the money enters the utility function (Weiss 1980; Abel 1987). The choice of a shopping time
2The standard cash-in-advance model is ct+1 ≤ νMt/Pt+1 with ν ≤ 1. In this model, it would yield the money
demand
Mt
Pt
= ν γ
1 + γ
1 + rt+1
1 + νrt+1
µ
wt
Pt
+ µt
¶
which is increasing in rt+1.
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model instead of a money in the utility function model stems from the fact that it simplifies
the algebra and that it allows the optimality of the Friedman Rule3 to be studied. Finally, the
assumption that households spend a given amount of time shopping is introduced to make the
algebra tractable. This assumption does not reduce the generality of the model because for
the low inflation equilibria below, it does not seem realistic to assume that there is a trade-
oﬀ between time spent shopping and time spent in production. Moreover, this formalization
of money demand preserves the cost of inflation extensively studied by Lucas (2000). Indeed,
because if this constraint household must keep some resources remunerated at a rate −π, whereas
the financial titles are remunerated at a rate rt+1 − πt+1 ≥ −πt+1. Note that the opportunity
cost to hold money disappears if the Friedman rule is applied. In this case, rt+1 = 0, and the
return on money is the equal to the return on financial markets.
The total financial savings of the workers at period t are
Ltst =
1
1 + γ
µ
γ − θ
1 + (1 + θ) rt+1
¶
(wt + Ptµt)Lt (7)
If there is no transaction constraint (θ = 0), the real value of savings Ltst
Pt
is simply proportional
to the real total revenue
³
wt
Pt
+ µt
´
Lt. Because of transaction constraint, the total amount of
savings is an increasing function of the nominal interest rate. As a consequence, an increase
in inflation for a given real interest rate increase the amount of financial savings. Indeed, it
decreases the demand for money and induces a shift toward remunerated financial instruments.
This the so-called Tobin eﬀect described in Tobin (1965), and which can be found in empirical
studies (Loayza et al., 2000). Of course, this partial equilibrium result has to be studied in
general equilibrium and in interaction with credit constraints.
3 In money-in-the-utility function models, normative conclusions on the Friedman Rule can be obtained only
if a satiation point is introduced in the utility function (Abel, 1987), which is not the case in Weiss (1980) or Weil
(1991). The introduction of such a satiation point makes it impossible to obtain analytical results with credit
constraints.
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Finally, total consumption from workers can be written in real terms as
Cworkt = Ltc
y
t + Lt−1c
o
t (8)
3 Production
3.1 Final Goods Sector
The representative firm in the final goods sector produces at period t with constant returns,
using labor and a quantity Kt of intermediate goods.
Yt = L
1−β
t K
β
t (9)
The total amount of intermediate goods Kt is bought from Nt intermediate goods producers
which are assumed to be perfect substitutes :
Kt =
Z Nt
0
yidi
The price of one unit of final goods at period t is denoted Pt. The price of the intermediate
goods is the same for all producers because of perfect substitutability and is denoted pintt at
period t. The wage rate is denoted wt. The program of the firm is thus
max
Lt,yi
PtYt −
Z Nt
0
pintyidi− wtLt
The first order condition yields the real wage
wt
Pt
= (1− β) Yt
Lt
(10)
If each intermediate goods producer sells only an amount of goods y = 1, which will be the case,
the above program gives the price of intermediate goods as a function of Nt :
pintt = βPt
µ
Lt
Nt
¶1−β
(11)
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3.2 Intermediate Sector
There are Lt entrepreneurs who live for two periods. They are risk-neutral and their utility
depends on their consumption of final good in their second period of life. At period t, each
newborn entrepreneur faces a shock ε, which determines the amount of final goods he must buy
to be able to produce one unit of intermediate good at period t+1, hence y = 1. The value ε is
a productivity shock: the higher is ε, the lower the productivity. The shock is idiosyncratic and
is drawn out of a density of distribution f which is common knowledge. If an entrepreneur does
not invest the amount ε then production does not take place. The financing decision will be
made in a situation of asymmetries of information which will yield credit constraints. I use in
this section the formalization of credit constraints used by Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), which
is based on moral hazard. The results would be the same if credit rationing were based on lack
of commitment as introduced by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). I have chosen Holmstrom and
Tirole’s formulation only because it is easier to compare the results with the first best outcome
of the model.
After the shock at period t, each entrepreneur can make two types of unverifiable eﬀort.
Either he makes a high eﬀort, in which case the probability of success is qH , or he cheats. In
this case, he can sell an amount B < 1 of intermediate goods for private use at period t+1 and
the probability of success in the production of the unit of final good is qL < qH . Because of the
probability of failure, the nominal interest rate paid by entrepreneurs includes a risk premium.
This interest rate is denoted r˜t+1 and is determined below.
As y = 1, the profits derived from production are pintt+1−Pt (1 + r˜t+1) ε. Hence, in case of high
eﬀort, the expected nominal remuneration of the entrepreneur is qH
¡
pintt+1 − Pt (1 + r˜t+1) ε
¢
. If
he cheats, his expected nominal remuneration becomes pintt+1B+ qL
¡
pintt+1 − Pt (1 + r˜t+1) ε
¢
. The
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condition for the entrepreneur not to cheat is
qH
¡
pintt+1 − Pt (1 + r˜t+1) ε
¢
≥ pintt+1B + qL
¡
pintt+1 − Pt (1 + r˜t+1) ε
¢
As lenders anticipate this constraint, they finance entrepreneurs only if the previous rela-
tionship is fulfilled, giving the incentive not to cheat and thus to get the highest return4. After
few calculations, and using the value of pintt given by equation (11), and with ∆q = qH − qL one
finds that the condition to be financed is ε ≤ ε∗t , where ε∗t is the threshold defined by
ε∗t = β
µ
1− B
∆q
¶µ
Lt+1
Nt+1
¶1−β
Pt+1
(1 + r˜t+1)Pt
(12)
The total number of firms which produce at period t+1 is the number of newborn entrepre-
neurs at period t whose shock satisfies ε ≤ ε∗t , and who produce with a probability qH . Hence,
if F denotes the cumulative distribution of shocks, F (ε) ≡
R ε
0 f (x) dx, the total number of
intermediate good producers at period t+ 1, Nt+1 is
Nt+1 = qHLtF (ε
∗
t ) (13)
As all the financed entrepreneurs have incentives to make the high eﬀort, the probability of
success is qH . The return of 1 unit of money invested in production is qH (1 + r˜t+1) and as the
riskless interest rate is rt+1, the competition among financiers yields
qH (1 + r˜t+1) = 1 + rt+1
The risk premium5 is thus 1
qH
. Using the previous equality and the value of Nt+1 given by (13)
in (12) yields
ε∗tF
1−β (ε∗t ) = β
µ
qH
1 + n
¶β 1 + n
Rt+1
µ
1− B
∆q
¶
(14)
4More formally, I assume that qL is low enough such that the lenders can be repaid only in the high eﬀort
case, as in Holmstrom and Tirole (1998a). A benchmark case is qL = 0.
5As households can fully diversify their risks, the net nominal revenue from savings is deterministic and equal
to rt+1. Moreover, aggregation in the final good sector makes the production of final goods and the real wage
deterministic.
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where the real interest rate Rt+1 was defined in equation (4). This equality defines ε∗t as a
function of Rt+1 and of the parameters of the model.
Because of moral hazard, some entrepreneurs with a positive net present value (NPV) are not
financed : entrepreneurs with a positive NPV have a shock such that the selling price is above
the financing cost pintt+1 ≥ Pt (1 + r˜t+1) ε, with as before qH (1 + r˜t+1) = 1+ rt+1. This yields the
threshold ε∗∗ below which entrepreneurs have a positive NPV. Substituting pintt+1 by its expression
given by (11), and as the number of intermediate good producers is NNPVt+1 = qHLtF (ε
∗∗
t ), one
finds that the threshold ε∗∗ satisfies the equality
ε∗∗t F
1−β (ε∗∗t ) = β
µ
qH
1 + n
¶β 1 + n
Rt+1
(15)
The threshold ε∗ is always below the threshold ε∗∗ because F 1−β is increasing. Strictly speaking,
the credit constrained entrepreneurs are those who have a project with a positive NPV, but who
are not financed. Hence those for whom ε∗ ≤ ε ≤ ε∗∗. The fraction of credit constrained firms
is thus F (ε
∗∗)−F (ε∗)
F (ε∗∗) . Note that the two thresholds are equal when the private gains B are equal
to 0. Indeed, in this case, there is no incentive problem and the complete contract result can
be obtained. The two thresholds increase when the real interest rate decreases. In particular,
the credit constraint threshold decreases, that is, more entrepreneurs are financed when the real
interest rate Rt+1 decreases. Indeed, the basic idea of this formulation of credit constraint is
that the financing contract must leave enough surplus for the entrepreneur in order to create
the incentives to make a high eﬀort. When the real interest rate increases, the firms have to
devote more resources to pay back their debt. As a consequence the surplus left for incentives
decreases, and more firms become credit constrained. A decrease in real interest rate is a means
to decrease the severity of credit constraint, for the very same mechanism6.
6This is a standard result in the credit constraints literature (Kiyotaki and Moore,1997; Holmstrom and Tirole,
1997)
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To give a simple specification for calibration purpose, I assume that the shock is uniformly
distributed on the segment [0..1]. As a consequence, f = 1, and if x ≤ 1, F (x) = x and
G (x) = x
2
2 . In this case, the threshold ε
∗ can be written, with equation (14) :
ε∗ (R) =
"
β
µ
qH
1 + n
¶β 1 + n
R
µ
1− B
∆q
¶# 12−β
(16)
ε∗ (R) is a decreasing function of R. The previous equality is true only when ε∗ (R) < 1. When
ε∗ (R) ≥ 1, the real interest rate is small enough such that all entrepreneurs are financed. I will
assume for now that ε∗ (R) < 1, which will be checked in the calibration exercise. With this
specification, the fraction of credit constrained firms is
ε∗∗ − ε∗
ε∗∗
= 1−
µ
1− B
∆q
¶ 1
2−β
(17)
An entrepreneur with a shock εt demands a quantity εt of final goods at period t, conditional on
the fact that he is financed : εt ≤ ε∗t . As a consequence, the total amount of final goods bought
by entrepreneurs at period t, It, is
It = LtG (ε
∗
t ) (18)
where the function G is defined by G (ε) ≡
R ε
0 xf (x) dx.
The total consumption of final goods by the financed entrepreneurs at period t + 1 is the
value of the production in final good
pintt+1
Pt+1
, minus the financing cost expressed in final goods
Pt(1+r˜t+1)
Pt+1
ε, times the probability of production qH . As a consequence, the total consumption of
entrepreneurs at period t+ 1, Centrt+1 is
Centrt+1 =
Z ε∗t
0
qH
µ
pintt+1
Pt+1
− Pt (1 + r˜t+1)
Pt+1
ε
¶
Ltf (ε) dε
Using the uniform distribution hypothesis, such that ε∗tF
β (ε∗t ) = 2G (ε
∗
t ) = (ε
∗
t )
2
, the definition
of Rt+1 and the expression pintt+1 given by equation (11), equations (13) and (16), one finds
Centrt+1 = Lt
1 + B∆q
1− B∆q
Rt+1G (ε
∗
t ) (19)
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Using the expression of the number of intermediate goods producers (13) with equation (9), one
can determine the production of final goods at period t :
Yt = L
1−β
t N
β
t =
µ
qH
1 + n
¶β
LtF
β
¡
ε∗t−1
¢
(20)
Finally, using equation (10), one finds the expression of the real wage :
wt
Pt
= (1− β)
µ
qH
1 + n
¶β
F β
¡
ε∗t−1
¢
(21)
This relationship proves that the workers also suﬀer from credit constraints, which decrease the
threshold ε∗t−1. Indeed, it reduces capital accumulation and hence labor productivity and the
real wage.
4 First Best Allocation
The ineﬃciencies created by the shopping time and the credit constraints can be exhibited by
comparing the previous results and the first best outcome of the model. As the focus of this
paper is on long run inflation, the following analysis studies the balanced growth path where
the real gross interest rate R and the credit threshold ε∗ are constant. As a consequence,
consumption per capita will be constant, and the growth rate of the economy will be simply
given by the growth rate of the population n. To determine the first best allocation, I assume
that the central planner maximizes the utility of a representative generation as in Weiss (1980).
The central planner has access to all resources in the economy and it faces the technological
shock ε on all types of intermediate goods, but it can observe the eﬀort of entrepreneurs and
hence it can force them to make the high eﬀort.
For the sake of generality, I assume that the central planner gives a weight η to workers and
a weight 1− η to entrepreneurs in the social welfare function. As entrepreneurs are risk neutral,
I simply assume that their utility function is u (c) = c.
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As the utility of private agents only depends on the consumption of final goods, the program
of the central planner is very simple7. It first maximizes the amount of final goods available
for consumption, that I denote as Y f , and then redistributes it optimally. Y f is equal to total
production minus the resources given to newborn entrepreneurs to be able to produce. Using
directly y = 1, Y f can be written as
Y f = L1−βt
Ã
qHLt−1
Z εopt
0
f (ε) dε
!β
− Lt
Z εopt
0
εf (ε) dε
where εopt is the threshold below which the entrepreneurs are not financed. The central planner
solves simply the following program
max
εopt
Y f
It yields the threshold εopt defined by the first order condition
εoptF
¡
εopt
¢1−β
= β
µ
qH
1 + n
¶β
(22)
To redistribute the final goods optimally the central planner maximizes the social welfare func-
tion, Us
max
cy,co,centr
η (ln cy + γ ln co) + (1− η) ce (23)
s.t. Ltc
y + Lt−1c
o + Lt−1c
e = Y f
Note that the amount ce is the average utility of all entrepreneurs, financed or not. It yields the
allocation for workers
co
cy
= γ (1 + n) (24)
7 It is thus assumed that the shopping time does not provide additional utility. If it is not the case, the results
in the following sections would be the same for the optimal value of inflation. But, only a second best could be
reached because workers would take time shopping in any case.
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Comparing the optimal values given by (22) and (24) with the decentralized values given by (5)
and (14), one can exhibit the eﬀects on welfare of the two market imperfections, the shopping
time and the credit constraints
First, comparing the equality (22) with equations (14), it is easy to show that in absence
of credit constraints (B = 0) the optimal level of production is obtained when the equality
R = 1 + n is satisfied. This expression is simply the Golden Rule which stipulates that the
real net interest rate must be equal to the growth rate of the economy. This result is standard
in OLG models where the central planner does not discount the utility of future generation
(Abel, 1987). When B = 0, the shopping time constraint can be cancelled by setting a nominal
interest rate equal to 0. Comparing equation (5) and equation (24), one sees that when r = 0
and R = 1 + n the workers, who face the shopping time constraint, can smooth optimally their
consumption, which is the standard result. Hence, when B = 0 the first best can be achieved if
R = 1 + n and r = 0, with lump sum transfers between entrepreneurs and workers.
Second, when credit constraints are binding, that is when B > 0, there is a new trade-oﬀ
between production and intertemporal allocation of consumption. Indeed, in this case, equations
(14) and (22) show that the financing threshold is equal to the optimal threshold, ε∗ = εopt when
R = Ropt, with
Ropt = (1 + n)
µ
1− B
∆q
¶
< 1 + n (25)
But then, intertemporal consumption is not optimal in the general case :
co
cy
= γ (1 + n)
µ
1− B
∆q
¶
1 + (1 + θ) r
1 + r
6= γ (1 + n)
Note that even if the Friedman Rule prevails, that is if r = 0, the allocation is not optimal:
co
cy = γ (1 + n)
³
1− B∆q
´
. This trade-oﬀ between production and allocation will be at the core
of the model. Indeed, in the following section, I prove that monetary policy can decrease the
long run real interest rate below 1+n by setting a positive nominal interest rate, which creates
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an additional distorting eﬀect on the consumption of workers compared to the first best. As
a consequence, the trade-oﬀ, which yields the optimal nominal interest rate, will be between
increasing production to come closer to the first best level, and increasing the distorting eﬀect
of a positive nominal interest rate.
When credit constraints are binding, the optimal level of production can be achieved only if
the economy is dynamically ineﬃcient in the sense of the seminal paper of Diamond (1965) and
of Abel et al. (1989). If the Golden Rule is verified in this credit constrained economy, then
there is under-investment and under-production in the long run. This result is not surprising.
Indeed, because of the asymmetries of information, the real interest rate does not convey the
right information about the social return on investment. The productivity of capital is higher
than the real interest rate if the Golden Rule prevails. A decrease in the real interest rate
(compared to the situation without credit constraint) is a means to stimulate investment. As a
direct consequence, the optimal real interest rate defined below will be a decreasing function of
severity of the incentive problems, measured by B∆q .
5 Market Equilibria and Solution of the Model
The following analysis concentrates on the balanced growth path where the exogenous money
supply grows at a constant rate, where the nominal interest rate r, the real gross interest
rate R, the credit threshold ε∗ and the gross inflation rate Π = Pt+1
Pt
are constant. As a
consequence, consumption of households and entrepreneurs are constant. I assume that the
monetary authorities choose the inflation rate and determine as a result the amount of money
given by helicopter drops to the young workers8. Hence, this section exhibits the solution of the
8 I have also solved the model with a more realistic process of money creation, which is open-market operations.
The results did not diﬀer qualitatively. Hence, the simple and well known framework is used.
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model as a function of the exogenous inflation rate.
There are four market equilibria which must be studied: the labor market, the final goods
market, the financial market and the money market. Because of the Walras Law, only three of
these equilibria need to be exhibited.
The labor market equilibrium simply states that all workers are employed. Hence, the size
of the labor working in the final goods sector at period t is Lt.
The good market equilibrium is the equality between total production in the final goods
sector, Yt and the sum of three terms: the consumption of workers Cworkt , the consumption of
entrepreneurs Centrt and the investment of newborn entrepreneurs, It:
Cworkt + C
entr
t + It = Yt (26)
The equilibrium on the financial market simply states that total investment is financed by the
financial savings of the workers.
Ltst = PtIt (27)
I denote Λt the stock of money in circulation at each end of period. As money is only held at
each period by the young workers, who hold Mt, the period t money market equilibrium is
LtMt = Λt (28)
Money growth comes from the helicopter drops to all young workers, which were denoted by µt
in real terms. Hence,
Λt − Λt−1 = LtPtµt (29)
Using the market equilibria, one can exhibit a relationship between inflation and the real interest
rate along a balanced growth path. This relationship is the result of the financial market
equilibrium which determines the real interest rate R, when it is taken into account the fact
that savings depends on inflation and the money transfer µ necessary to induce the level of
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inflation Π. The calculations to reach this expression are not insightful and are thus presented
in appendix. One finds
Π =
1
1+γ +
1−β
β
2
1− B∆q
− 1+n
R
1
1+γ −
1+θ
θ
+ 1+θ
θ
γ
1+γ
1−β
β
2
1− B∆q
R
1+n
1
1 + n
(30)
The previous equality is the central relationship of the model. It exhibits the long run relation-
ship between the inflation rate and the real interest rate. First, even when there is no credit
constraints, that is when B = 0, a change in the inflation rate aﬀects the real interest rate and
the long run stock of capital. As a consequence, money is not super-neutral even when there are
no credit constraints. The long run eﬀects of inflation come from the non Ricardian structure,
as has been shown in previous works, notably Weiss (1980), Buitter (1988) and Weil (1991).
New agents will enter the economy in the future and receive new money. As a consequence,
agents not yet born will benefit from money creation and agents living today face the cost of a
high nominal interest rate and a high inflation rate, which increases the opportunity cost to hold
money. This taxation of their second period wealth tends to increase real savings and hence to
decrease the real interest rate. Indeed, the calibration below shows that for realistic values of
the parameters, the real interest rate is a decreasing function of the inflation rate. This result
is found in various settings such as the two periods OLG (Weiss, 1980) or the infinitely living
agents OLG model (Weil, 1991).
However, in the general case, two eﬀects are at stake depending on the gains for the household
of a decrease in the real interest rate. Indeed, assume that the workers gain all the revenue from
production such that β tends toward 0. In this case, the inflation rate can be written as
Π =
1 + γ
γ
θ
1 + θ
1
R
which defines a decreasing relationship between inflation and the real interest rate. If β tends
toward 1, the eﬀect on the denominator in (30) vanishes and the inflation rate is an increasing
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function of the real interest rate. The reason for this is that the total eﬀect on savings of
a decrease in the nominal interest depends on the eﬀect on the revenue of workers given by
equation (21). If the real wage does not depend on R, then money creation has a negative
eﬀect on savings. Indeed, an increase in money creation µ decreases the nominal interest rate.
Indeed, as
∂
mt
Pt
∂µt
= θ 11+γ
1+rt+1
1+(1+θ)rt+1
< 1, the nominal interest rate rt+1 has to decrease for the
extra money to be accepted. This decrease in the nominal interest rate contributes to decrease
the savings, which contributes to an increase in the real interest rate.
Before turning to the eﬀect of inflation on welfare, one can exhibit the inflation rate which
yields the optimal level of production. Indeed, using (30), the inflation rate Πprod which allows
to reach Ropt =
³
1− B∆q
´
(1 + n) is
Πprod =
1
1+γ +
³
21−β
β
− 1
´
1
1− B∆q
1
1+γ +
³
2 γ1+γ
1−β
β
− 1
´
1+θ
θ
1
1 + n
When β < 2/3, this inflation rate Πprod is an increasing function of the severity of the credit
constraints B∆q . The value β is capital share in total revenue, which is around
1
3 . The assumption
β < 23 is thus quite realistic. The more severe the credit constraints, the higher the inflation
rate which allows the first best level of production to be reached. But, although it reaches the
first best value of production, this inflation rate is not optimal because it does not consider the
distorting eﬀect of inflation on the consumption of households. The following section studies
the eﬀect of inflation on welfare.
6 Inflation and Welfare
This section studies the eﬀect of inflation on welfare to determine the optimal inflation rate.
The social welfare function is the one given above:
Us = ηUwork + (1− η) centr (31)
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where Uwork is the utility of workers and centr is the utility of entrepreneurs which is linear in
consumption. Some algebra is necessary to express the consumption of each agent as a function
of the real interest rate R and the inflation rate. Then using the relationship (30), one can
compute social welfare as a function of the inflation rate Π. These calculations are performed in
appendix B. Because the results are too involved, it is not insightful to deduce explicit values of
the optimal inflation rate. Instead, a simple calibration of the model yields interesting results.
Six parameters have to be determined, γ, β, n, qH and B∆q and θ. Diﬀerent values for these
parameters are used in the literature (Rios-Rull, 1996; De La Croix and Michel, 2002). As the
main focus of this paper is on the production process, it is natural to assume that a generation
corresponds to the average utilization period of an investment good in national account, which
is 12 years. The value of the household annual discount rate is set to the standard value of 0.97.
The annual real growth rate of the economy is assumed to be 2%. The capital share in GDP is
set to β = 0.33. I assume that qH = .99, such that there is 1% of bankruptcies at each period.
This number is the average rate of business failures in the US9.
To determine a realistic value of B∆q , one can use the empirical literature on financing con-
straint and corporate investment such as Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) or Chirinko
and Schaller (1995). The goal of these papers is to show that firms are credit constrained by
proving that additional cash flow increases investment after controlling for the opportunities of
investment. Without credit constraints, the cash flow would not influence investment. Using
diﬀerent samples, these papers usually find that one additional dollar increases investment by
an amount from 0.1 to 0.4 dollars. I take the conservative value of 0.1. As only the credit
constrained firms would invest an additional dollar, this number implies that 10% of the firms
are credit constrained. Using equation (17) to set ε
∗∗−ε∗
ε∗∗ = 10%, I get the value
B
∆q = 0.16
9This number is taken from the Statistical Abstract of the US, section 17 for the period from 1980 to 1998.
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Figure 2: c
o
cy as a function of π
The value of θ is determined to reach a realistic value of the real money balances in the
economy, M1/GDP . This ratio varies from 14% in the US to 30% in the Euro area in 2003.
I take the average value of 20%. The expression of money demand is provided in appendix B
and yields a value θ = 0.55 for realistic values of the real interest rate (less than 5%). Finally, I
assume that η = 0.5 such that the entrepreneurs and the workers enter with the same weight in
the social welfare function.
Figure 1 plots the value of the social welfare as a function of the annual net inflation rate. The
welfare reaches its maximum at an annual inflation rate equal to 1.4%. Using the relationship
(30), one finds that the annual nominal interest rate is equal to 2.7%. The value of ε∗ stays
below 1 for the whole range of values of inflation. To understand the trade-oﬀ behind this graph,
figures 2 and 3 plots the surplus left for consumption and the ratio c
o
cy . Figure 2 plots the ratio
of consumption of old workers on the consumption of young workers. The horizontal line is
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Figure 3: Total Consumption as a function π
the first best value of this ratio, given by γ(1 + n). The ratio is downward slopping because
inflation decreases the return on savings, and thus creates incentives to consume more when
young. Hence, young workers save more on financial markets to compensate only partially for
the decrease on the return on money holdings. The optimal smoothing is obtained for a value
of inflation equal to 2.3%.
Figure 3 plots the surplus per capita left for the consumption of private agents (that is
(Y − I)/L). The surplus is maximized for π = −1.8%. If workers could perfectly smooth their
consumption, the optimal inflation rate would be the value that maximizes this surplus. But at
this maximum, one can see in figure 2, that consumption of old workers is too high. Hence, a
higher inflation than the one which maximizes surplus permits a better consumption smoothing
and is optimal although total consumption is smaller. For this reason, the optimal inflation rate
is between the inflation rate which optimizes smoothing and the one which maximizes surplus.
The result that the value of inflation which maximizes the surplus is lower than the value which
allows optimal smoothing is not robust. It is actually reversed when 50% of the firms are credit
constraint. What is robust is that these two values diﬀer and hence that the optimal value of
inflation yields a second best.
To exhibit the eﬀect of credit constraints on the optimal inflation rate, figure 3 plots the
optimal annual net inflation rate as a function of the percentage of credit constrained firms,
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Figure 4: Optimal Inflation Rate as a function of the Percentage of Credit Constraint Firms
which was previously set to 10%. It is checked that credit constraints are binding for every
value of the parameter, that is ε∗ < 1. As previously explained, the optimal inflation rate
is an increasing function of the severity of credit constraints. Indeed, when the number of
credit constraint firms increases the production ineﬃciency worsened compared to the allocating
ineﬃciency. In this case, a higher inflation permits to increase production, at the cost of a
greater allocating ineﬃciency. The convex shape of this function comes from decreasing returns
in production. When more firms are credit constrained, the marginal increase in the number
of credit constrained firms becomes more costly and it is thus optimal to raise the marginal
increase in inflation.
Note that the optimal inflation rate does not converge toward the value implied by the
Friedman Rule, Π = 11+n , as
B
∆q tends toward 0, that is when credit constraints disappear.
Indeed, since Abel (1987), it is known that the Friedman Rule is optimal in non Ricardian
Frameworks only if fiscal policy is designed to reach the optimal real interest rate : fiscal policy
cancels the imperfections created by the non Ricardian Structure, and monetary policy with the
Friedman Rule cancels the eﬀect of the monetary constraints. As there is no fiscal policy here,
there is no reason why the Friedman Rule should be optimal.
The goal of this simple calibration was to show that the trade-oﬀ between production and
allocation yields realistic values for the long run inflation rate, which is close to the actual target
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of monetary authorities in developed countries. This simple model also gives a simple reason
for which the inflation rate is higher in less developed countries. Indeed, as financial markets
are less eﬃcient, credit constraints are more severe, and the increase in production may be more
important than the allocation eﬃciency. Of course, many others factors are at stake and a
detailed empirical study is left for future works.
Until now it has been assumed that only monetary policy was used to increase welfare. The
next section introduces a simple fiscal policy to reach the first best.
7 A Simple Fiscal Policy to Reach the First Best
The first best outcome could not be reached in the previous section because only monetary policy
was available. In this section, a simple fiscal policy is introduced to counter this distorting eﬀect
and to reach the first best allocation.
There are three imperfections in this model. The first one is the non Ricardian structure
which entails that the equilibrium long run real interest rate may not be optimal. The second is
the monetary constraint modeled by a shopping time model. The third is the credit constraint.
As was explained above, it is known that in the presence of the first two constraints the Friedman
Rule and the Golden Rule are optimal. Here, the third constraint entails that the Golden Rule
is no longer optimal on the production side. As a consequence, the Friedman Rule is no longer
a natural benchmark, because of the new trade-oﬀ between production and allocation. The goal
of monetary and fiscal policy is now to allow jointly for both optimal production and optimal
consumption.
The basic idea to reach the first best is to introduce a distorting taxation scheme, which
cancels the distorting eﬀect of inflation. The main constraint on this fiscal policy is that the
information set available to the State to define its transfers must be realistic. For this reason,
26
I assume that the State does not observe the shock faced by entrepreneurs. Hence, it has less
information than financial markets on the ability of entrepreneurs to produce and no transfer of
capital is possible. Moreover, I assume that the budget of the State is balanced at each period.
Even with these constraints, a simple fiscal policy which aﬀects only the workers can reach the
first best allocation, when it is used with an optimal monetary policy. The only information
that the State must know is the consumption of young workers, or equivalently the money they
hold. Roughly speaking, as there are three imperfections, one needs three tools. These are a
lump-sum transfer, a distorting transfer and the inflation rate.
Assume that the State introduces a lump sum real tax τy taken from young workers, and
gives a net nominal amount λPtc
y
t to young workers at period t + 1 if they have consumed c
y
t
at period t. λ can be either positive or negative. The transfer is proportional to consumption,
what is known by young workers. The program of the workers is now
max
c
y
t ,c
o
t+1,st,Mt
ln (cyt ) + γ ln
¡
cot+1
¢
s.t. Ptc
y
t + st +Mt = wt + Ptµt − Ptτy
Pt+1c
o
t+1 = st (1 + rt+1) +Mt + λtPtc
y
t
Mt = θPtc
y
t with θ ≤ 1
It yields
cot+1
c
y
t
= γ
Pt
Pt+1
((1 + θ) (1 + rt+1)− (λt + θ)) (32)
Now assume that at each period the coeﬃcient λt is set by the fiscal authorities to the value
λt =
Ã
θ + 1− 1
1− B∆q
!
(1 + rt+1)− θ (33)
which depends only on the parameters of the model and on rt+1. With this value, the ratio (32)
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becomes
cot+1
c
y
t
= γ
Rt+1
1− B∆q
(34)
As a consequence, for the value of the gross real interest rate which yields the first best level of
production, given by (25), Ropt = (1 + n)
³
1− B∆q
´
, the allocation of consumption between the
two life periods of workers is optimal, as can be seen from equation (24). The inflation rate and
the lump-sum transfer have now to be determined jointly to balance the budget of the State
and to yield, as a decentralized outcome, R = Ropt.
For the sake of generality, I introduce a tax on the consumption of entrepreneurs. Each
entrepreneur pays a fraction ζ < 1 of its revenue to the State. Entrepreneurs who do not
produce pay no tax. The total consumption of entrepreneurs is
C˜entrt+1 = (1− ζ)Centrt+1
with the value Centrt+1 given as before by equation (19). This tax does not aﬀect the moral
hazard problem of entrepreneurs because, firstly, only entrepreneurs for which the incentive
constraint is binding are financed in any case. Secondly, entrepreneurs derive utility only from
the consumption of final good. Hence, as soon as they can consume something, that is ζ < 1,
they have incentive to try to be financed.
The budget constraint of the state at period t+ 1 is
ζCentrt+1 + Lt+1τ
y = Ltλtc
y
t (35)
The market equilibria are the same as the ones given in section 5. Using these market equilibria,
one can find the value of inflation for which the interest rate is equal to its optimal value
Ropt = (1 + n)
³
1− B∆q
´
. The detailed calculations are performed in the appendix C. With the
parameters given above, figure 5 plots the optimal inflation rate10 for two diﬀerent values of the
10There are other solutions for the optimal inflation rate, but below −2%. These ones do not define equilibria
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Figure 5: Annual Optimal Inflation for ζ = 0 and ζ ' 1.
tax ζ on the consumption of entrepreneurs, as a function of the percentage of credit constrained
firms (in the neighborhood of 10%). Diﬀerent values of ζ corresponds to diﬀerent value of η
is the social welfare function. The limit case where ζ ' 1 corresponds obviously to the case
where the only the utility of workers enter in the social welfare function, η = 1.The solid line
corresponds to the case ζ ' 1, and the dash line which is below corresponds to ζ = 0. The
optimal inflation rate is an increasing function of the fraction of constrained firms, for the same
reason as the ones of the previous section. The first best inflation rate is above the second
best one because of the eﬀect of fiscal policy on consumption: first, inflation has to be high
enough to reach the optimal saving rate. But, consumption of old workers is decreasing with
inflation because, although workers save more because of inflation, they do not fully compensate
the decrease in the return on money. Hence, consumption of old workers has to subsidize to
reach the first best. Indeed, with the given parameters one finds an average value of λ = 0.3.
But then, young workers have less incentives to save because their money holdings (or their
consumption when young) are remunerated. Hence, inflation has to increase more to provide
the correct incentives to save. Finally, when workers are favored in the social welfare function,
inflation is higher because higher inflation decreases the real interest rate what favors investment
because the return on money would be greater than the real interest rate Ropt, hence no resources would be lent
on the financial markets and production would collapse.
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and the real wage.
The result of this section is that the first best outcome of the model can be reached if fiscal
policy is designed jointly with monetary policy, although credit constraints are binding and
inflation is positive. But, fiscal policy is often used for redistributive purposes independently of
the monetary policy. Hence, it is diﬃcult to argue that the actual distorting transfers correspond
to the optimal fiscal policy presented here. As a consequence, the result of the previous section
without any optimization on fiscal policy yields more interesting results both on the positive
side and on the normative side. For this reason, the optimal fiscal policy has been introduced as
an extension and the inflation target determined in the previous section may be more realistic.
Nevertheless, the result that the optimal inflation rate depends on the nature of the fiscal policy
is of independent interest.
8 Conclusion
This paper studies the optimal inflation rate in a simple monetary non Ricardian setting with
credit rationing. Because of credit constraints, the standard Golden Rule, which stipulates
that the real interest rate must be equal to the growth rate of the economy, yields under-
investment. A decrease in the real interest rate can increase investment and bring it closer to
its first best value. Second, because of the non Ricardian framework the inflation rate has a
long run eﬀect on the real interest rate. More precisely, it has been shown that an increase
in the inflation rate decreases the real interest rate and increases capital accumulation. This
"Tobin eﬀect" of inflation on investment (Weil, 1991) is a first eﬀect of inflation in the long run.
The second eﬀect of inflation is the standard distorting eﬀect in monetary economies: inflation
aﬀects the opportunity cost of holding money and prevents workers from smoothing optimally
their consumption. It has been shown that the trade-oﬀ between these two eﬀects yield a theory
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of the optimal long run inflation rate, which is consistent with the actual practice of central
banks. Moreover, when the level of credit rationing increases, the optimal real interest rate
decreases and the optimal inflation rate increases. As a consequence, the more eﬃcient the
financial market, the lower the optimal long run inflation rate. The previous results provide a
second best theory of inflation because the first best can not be reached with only monetary
policy. As a simple extension, a simple fiscal policy which is basically a proportional tax (or
subsidy) on consumption is introduced. The first best allocation can be reached if fiscal and
monetary policy are jointly optimally defined. In this case, the first best value of inflation is
higher than the second best value. As a consequence, the optimal inflation rate depends on
the nature of the fiscal policy. Finally, as fiscal policy is often used for redistributive purposes
independent of inflation, it may not be realistic to assume that this fiscal policy can not be
implemented. For this reason, the optimal inflation rate based only on an optimal monetary
policy seems a more realistic target.
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A Proof of equality 30
Using the financial market equilibrium (27), together with the amount of savings (7), and total
investment (18), one finds
1
1 + γ
µ
γ − θ
1 + (1 + θ) (RΠ− 1)
¶µ
wt
Pt
+ µ
¶
= G (ε∗) (36)
Using the demand for money (6), together with the money market equilibrium (28), one finds
Λt
Lt
1
Pt
= θ
1
1 + γ
RΠ
1 + (1 + θ) (RΠ− 1)
µ
wt
Pt
+ µ
¶
where I have substituted the nominal interest rate by its value r = RΠ− 1. The right hand side
is constant along a steady state, because R, Π and µ are constant by assumption. Hence, ε∗ and
wt
Pt
are constant because of equations (16) and (21). The previous equation yields that Λt
Lt
1
Pt
is
constant and hence
Π =
Λt
Λt−1
1
1 + n
This is obviously the determination of inflation by the quantity of money.
Money growth comes from the helicopter drops to all young workers, which were denoted by
µt in real terms. Hence,
Λt − Λt−1 = LtPtµt
It yields
µt =
Λt − Λt−1
LtPt
=
Λt
PtLt
µ
1− Λt−1
Λt
¶
Using the four previous equations with (28), one finds
µ =
µ
1− 1
Π (1 + n)
¶
θ
1
1 + γ
RΠ
1 + (1 + θ) (RΠ− 1)
µ
wt
Pt
+ µ
¶
(37)
This equality relates the amount of money given to each young workers to the inflation rate, the
real interest rate and the total revenue of young workers.
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The equation (37) can be used to find the relationship between inflation and the real interest
rate. Indeed, the real wage is given by equation (21). As F (ε∗) = ε∗ and G (ε∗) = (ε
∗)2
2 , and
because of the definition of ε∗ given by (16), one gets
F β (ε∗)
G (ε∗)
=
2
³
qH
1+n
´−β
β
³
1− B∆q
´ R
1 + n
(38)
Using equation (21), (37) and (38) to substitute for w
P
and µ in equation (36), one finally finds
the equation (30).
B Welfare as a function of Inflation
The average consumption of an entrepreneur, centr = Centrt+1 /Lt, can be easily calculated with
equations (16) and (19). It yields
centr = A
µ
1− B
∆q
¶ β
2−β
µ
1 +
B
∆q
¶
R
− β
2−β (39)
where the constant A = 12
·
β
³
qH
1+n
´β
(1 + n)
¸ 2
2−β
does not depend on B∆q . The average con-
sumption of an entrepreneur is a decreasing function of the real interest rate. This result is
obvious because first the real interest is only a cost for the entrepreneurs. Second, an increase in
the real interest rate increases credit rationing and decreases production. As entrepreneurs are
risk neutral, and as the shocks are i.i.d, this value is also the expected utility before the shock.
The utility of a worker is Uwork = ln
¡
cj
¢
+ γ ln (cv). Using equations (2), (3), together with
equations (37) and (36), one finds
cy = Π
RG (ε∗)
γ (1 + (1 + θ) (RΠ− 1))− θ
co =
γRG (ε∗)
γ − θ1+(1+θ)(RΠ−1)
Using these expressions in the utility function Uwork = ln (cy) + γ ln (co) yields the following
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equation:
Uwork = (1 + γ) ln
RG (ε∗)
γ − θ1+(1+θ)(RΠ−1)
− ln
µ
(θ + 1)R− θ
Π
¶
+ γ ln γ (40)
This expression yields a relationship Uwork (R), with the expression of ε∗ given by equation (16)
and the expression of the inflation rate as a function of R given by the relationship (30).
The optimal inflation rate is now simple to determine. With relationships (39) and (40), one
can express the social welfare Us given by (31) as a function of the real interest rate R. With
the equality (30), the relationship between Π and Us can be deduced.
The demand for money (6), with equation (10) gives
MtLt
PtY
= θ
1− β
1 + γ
1 + rt+1
1 + (1 + θ) rt+1
wt
Pt
+ µt
wt
Pt
Using (21), (37) and (38), one finds
MtLt
PtY
=
1
2
θβ (1 + n)Π
1− B∆q
γ (1 + (1 + θ) r)− θ (41)
C Optimal Inflation Rate with fiscal Policy
The goal of this appendix is to construct an equilibrium such that R = Ropt, with the fiscal
policy given in the text.
The solution of the program of workers yields the consumption, the real savings and the real
demand for money
c
y
t =
1
1 + γ
µ
1− B
∆q
¶µ
wt
Pt
+ µt − τy
¶
(42)
cot+1 = γ
Rt+1
1 + γ
µ
wt
Pt
+ µt − τy
¶
st
Pt
=
µ
1− 1 + θ
1 + γ
µ
1− B
∆q
¶¶µ
wt
Pt
+ µt − τy
¶
Mt
Pt
= θ
1
1 + γ
µ
1− B
∆q
¶µ
wt
Pt
+ µt − τy
¶
(43)
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Using the money demand (43) instead of equation (6), the money market equilibrium yields
µt =
µ
1− 1
Π (1 + n)
¶
θ
1
1 + γ
µ
1− B
∆q
¶µ
wt
Pt
+ µt − τy
¶
instead of equation (37).
The financial market equilibrium yields
wt
Pt
+ µt − τy =
1
1− 1+θ1+γ
³
1− B∆q
´G (ε∗) (44)
instead of equation (36).
Substituting for µt and using the equality (21) and the relationship (38), one finds
1
1− 1+θ1+γ
³
1− B∆q
´
=
1− β
β
2
1− B∆q
R
1 + n
+
µ
1− 1
Π (1 + n)
¶
θ
1 + γ
1− B∆q
1− 1+θ1+γ
³
1− B∆q
´ − τy
G (ε∗)
The value of the real interest rate which yields the optimal value of production is Ropt =
(1 + n)
³
1− B∆q
´
. Substituting R by this value in the previous equation, one finds the optimal
value of inflation, after few calculations:
Πopt =
1
1 + n
1
1− 1+γ
θ
1
1− B∆q
³
1 +
³
1− 1+θ1+γ
³
1− B∆q
´´³
τy
G(εopt) − 2
1−β
β
´´
This expression is the value of inflation which yields as an outcome of the financial market and
the money market equilibria R = Ropt. It still depends on the the tax paid by young workers,
which is endogenous. This one is given by the budget constraint of the State. It yields (35)
τy =
1
1 + n
Ã
λcy − ζ
1 + B∆q
1− B∆q
RG
¡
εopt
¢!
(45)
One can use equations (42), (44), (19) and the equality R = (1 + n)
³
1− B∆q
´
to substitute for
c
y
t . It gives the following equality (46).
τy =

 λ
1 + n
1
1 + γ
1
1− 1+θ1+γ
³
1− B∆q
´ − ζ 1 + B∆q
1− B∆q


µ
1− B
∆q
¶
G (ε∗) (46)
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Finally, the value of λ is obtained with the equality 1 + r = RΠ = (1 + n)
³
1− B∆q
´
Π used in
equation (33). It yields :
λ =
µ
θ − (θ + 1) B
∆q
¶
(1 + n)Π− θ (47)
Using this value of λ in equation (46), to substitute for the value of τy in equation (45), one
finds an implicit function in Π. The solution Πopt of this equation is the value of the inflation
rate which yields the equilibrium real interest rate Ropt. Indeed, if monetary authorities set
Π = Πopt, then there exists a decentralized equilibrium such as R = Ropt. By construction, the
budget of the State and of private agents are balanced, first order conditions of workers and
entrepreneurs are fulfilled, the money market, the financial market (and hence the good market
because of the Walras Law) are at equilibrium. In the general case, there may be multiple
equilibria. This issue is discussed in the calibrated example given in the text.
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